Market Romantics
Here are the market celebrators, famous for finding in competition the solution to whatever ails health policy. The argument is familiar: Fostering markets will improve efficiency, empower consumers, control costs, and overthrow the rigid, unresponsive bureaucracies that have long outlived whatever useful purposes they may have served. European policy makers are familiar with the exhortations, for they have seen and heard them in a steady flow of articles, books, conferences, and consultants. Indeed, Americans who are skeptical of this perspective raise alarms about the marketing of markets. (For an especially piquant instance, see Marmor and Plowden 1991.) But, as we shall suggest below, European liberalism-as they call the market ideology-rises up from indigenous political circumstances more than it blows in from the West.
In practice, health care competition looks radically different in different political regimes. Closer inspection quickly reveals the political agendas and institutional biases lurking within the crypto health care markets of Western Europe. The market regimes include such anomalies (from the true believers' perspective) as markets almost fully internal to a staterun national health service (in Britain) or markets powerfully regulated by indicative state planners (the German experience, at least to date). Everywhere competitive devices are driven into place by domestic politics. Markets are mobilized to empower state officials vis-a-vis health care providers or to address perceived inequities between professionals and blue-collar workers. Their champions range from the rightist Tories in England to the leftist Social Democrats in Germany.
The early experience, then, is that European social welfare systems use markets in very different ways. But the scope and consequences are far more limited than analogies to the American experience would suggest. The market romantics respond that once the forces are fully unleashed, they will gather a momentum of their own-precisely what the social welfare romantics fear.
Social Welfare Romantics
Social welfare romantics take a far less sanguine view of the innovations sweeping across Europe. From this perspective, recent changes portend the end of an admirable ideal: the citizenship right to roughly equal health care. To be sure, the pace of change varies: Market reforms are going into place in England, Germany, and Italy; they have been snared at implementation in the Netherlands; they are still being debated in Sweden and Norway. But whatever the pace, market reforms mark the end of universalism. They will subvert decades of commitment to equity and social democracy. Copayments erect barriers to care; providers or payers competing for patients have economic incentives to discriminate among them. From this perspective, these developments corrode the old logic of social solidarity. The consequences may be inadvertent-political blunders by politicians on the left, an overly idealized vision of capitalism on the right. But they reflect and accelerate a broad crisis of the universalist, midcentury welfare state.
Ironically, the loss is felt acutely by social democrats in the United States. After all, the European welfare regimes have long served as an ideal, a promise that political reforms could yield social equity. As reformers have tirelessly reminded American policy makers, our partners in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) offer powerful evidence that social justice can be expanded while health care costs are controlled. Indeed, the data seemed to suggest the two go hand in hand.
From this perspective, even European troubles look like success. The Germans speak of the health care "cost disease." And, naturally, costs are what have driven the Europeans to market (as it almost drove Americans in the opposite direction). But the German discourse of cost trouble rings odd in American ears: In the 1980s, their health care inflation for the entire decade amounted only to the average increase the United States experienced each year (as a percentage of gross domestic product) (Morone 1990) . The difference is that each incremental increase in Germany or France comes directly from a payroll tax shared by employers and employees. (In Germany, the employers' share rose 20 percent between 1980 and 1994 [Hinrichs 19951.) Even small increases are highly visible, especially during recessions. The American system, in contrast, disperses and thus masks the cost of medical inflation. The inflation intolerance in a country like Germany testifies to a well-organized health care politics.
But if this is so, why have market reforms swept across Europe? Raw admiration of European universalism leaves true believers no way to explain the shifting ground. Surely there is more at work than the misguided application of a bad American notion. Those who admire the European social democracies ought to give the European social democrats more credit.
The articles in this issue all offer explanations for this turn to markets. Although there are examples of both these first two perspectives, the dominant voice is the one least often heard in the American debate: the market as policy adjustment.
Policy Tinkerers
Many Europe analysts take the American experience as frankly irrelevant. They dismiss the stormy debate over health markets. From this perspective, competitive forces in health care offer neither panacea nor peril. Innovations such as patient cost sharing or competing health providers are simply policy tools at the disposal of state officials. Market reforms are deployed in roughly the same spirit as, say, local hospital planning boards.
From this perspective, European social welfare regimes all share a great contrast to the American case: They approach market innovations with a well-institutionalized commitment to universal health care coverage. The state remains active-financing, regulating, planning. Indeed, the state deploys market mechanisms for its own purposes-to control health providers, break bureaucratic gridlock, expand its own authority, or (theoretically) enhance the efficiency of hospital care. As they take on competitive features, many of the OECD systems even begin to resemble the health care regime imagined by the Clinton health reformers. (The similarities are not, of course, serendipitous; Americans looked long and hard at European health care [Glaser 19941.) Indeed, American observers, left and right, treat European reforms much as they judged the Clinton effort: From the right, the complaint that the heavy hand of government burdens the systems and vitiates the bene-fits of market innovation; from the left, the fear that markets and universal coverage are incompatible, that these new principles will wreck European welfare states as surely as they would have subverted the Clinton effort.
Which perspective is most accurate? The answer turns partially on the legacy of past politics. Does it make a difference if market-style reforms are deployed in systems with deep philosophical and institutional commitments to universalism? Can market reforms act as efficiency adjustments or political maneuvers that do not fundamentally alter the social welfare state (as Frederik Schut argues in this volume)? Or are they emblematic of a profound crisis-possibly the end-of social solidarity as an organizing political principle? (See also Karl Hinrichs's article in this issue.) Perhaps both perspectives are true; the consequences of competition may vary from country to country, turning on such matters as trust in government, the scope of financial crisis, and the legitimacy of social welfare policy. In support of the relativist view, Maurizio Ferrera (1995) suggests that precisely these factors have subverted universalism in Italy, while Garpenby, Erichsen, and Anton all discover universalism alive and well in Scandinavia.
Of course, health care changes do not operate in a vacuum. All the permutations of health policy are shaped by the broader forces remaking the industrial world.
The Social Framework: Toward a New Europe?
European politics are shifting under the weight of two great changes: opening markets and immigration. The trends have different impacts in different countries. But both place new pressures on traditional welfare states. Although the articles in this volume do not focus directly on open markets (and they barely touch on immigration), these developments form an implicit structural framework for the analyses that follow. Consider each in turn.
Immigration
Distributive justice presupposes, as Walzer points out, "a bounded world within which the distribution takes place" (Walzer 1983: 31) . Within those boundaries, social solidarity is evoked by some shared principle-"a common civilization" (Marshall 1949) , "an imagined community" (Anderson 1983) , or "kinship and fellow feeling" (Freeman 1986: 52) . The unifying communal principle varies. Being German is an ethnocul-tural, racial, Volk-centered fact; being French is essentially a political identity linked to abstract citizenship ideals and traditionally available to everyone living on French soil (Brubaker 1992) . But whatever the underlying logic, welfare states are built on and extend the sense of common social identity. They are most powerful when they become a kind of universal public good-all contribute, all are eligible (Faist and Jordan 1994) . Today immigration poses a challenge to the traditional welfare state logic by reconstituting the communities that sustain them.
The fall of communism threw open previously sealed borders. Economic disparities between North and South (and East and West) increase demands for entry into the wealthy Western states. And, despite the political rhetoric about "floods" of foreigners, the pressure for low-wage work (to compete in global markets) has led companies in wealthy nations to seek foreign workers. (Gary Freeman suggests that a tacit compact between business and unions keeps "mainstream" wages high but draws on immigrants for low-wage and relatively undesirable jobs [Freeman 1986: 56; Faist 19941 .) Germany has received still more immigrants than the United States (eighteen million and sixteen million, respectively, since World War 11) (Faist 1994: 5; Bade 1994: 89) . Paradoxically, Germans do not consider their nation "a country of immigration," whereas that is precisely how Americans see themselves. How do we reconcile the immigration numbers with the national self-images? The answer lies in different understandings of citizen andforeigner. The largest category of German newcomer is ethnic German (or Aussiedler), a relatively vague category of cultural Germans "returning home" after generations, even centuries. Ethnic Germans are not construed as immigrants at all. In contrast, the relatively few "foreign" guestworkers (Auslunder) constitute a highly charged political matter. The five million Auslander in western Germany are often non-European and non-Christian (one-fifth are from Turkey). They prompt charges of welfare fraud, "over-foreignization ," and a "racialized society." For the Auslander, naturalization is extremely difficult (Faist 1994) .
In France, the rate of immigration has been far less rapid (there are 3.6 million foreigners in France), and naturalization has traditionally been much simpler. Even so, the politics of immigration have grown bitter in recent years. In highly publicized incidents, the avowedly secular French state has confronted devout Muslim communities (especially on educational matters). Naturalization has grown more difficult (Rex 1992: 109-110) . And an ardently anti-immigrant candidate, Jean-Marie Le Pen, polled an extraordinary 15 percent in the first round of the presidential election in April 1995 (Ibrahim 1995) . In England, immigration has turned more explicitly on racial questions (although more than one-half of the postcolonial newcomers have been white). The race and immigrant questions strain traditional notions of social welfare. Social policy in Britain, writes Barbara Hudson, is increasingly seen as an "issue of criminal justice rather than social justice'' (Hudson 1993: 23; Faist and Jordan 1994: 23) . Still, for all the publicity over immigration to Germany, France, and England, Europe's highest foreign naturalization rates are in Sweden (3.7 percent each year as a percentage of total population) and Norway (3.5 percent) (Asian Regional Programme 1990: 1.4).
The politics that follow from the immigration issue are not simple. As in the United States, both left and right are divided. The free market right cheers open borders for the effect on labor markets; the cultural right laments them for "diluting" an ostensibly purer native stock. On the left, labor presses for restrictions in the name of both private jobs and public welfare; others on the left emphasize human rights and defend open borders. The rifts and alliances among these perspectives vary from nation to nation. But across the OECD, the results add up to new pressures on the welfare state.
The new people pose a challenge. They raise the most fundamental question a nation can ask: "Who are we?" Or, expressed more pointedly, "Can we consider these new immigrants one of us?"
The result, in Gary Freeman's terms, is the "Americanization of European welfare politics." Many European states now experience the racial and ethnic divisions that have long marred working-class politics in the United States (Freeman 1986: 62; Katznelson 198 1) . Unhappily, multiculturalism splits the working class into mutually suspicious groups, provokes right-wing counterattacks, and undermines labor's strength by easing labor markets. At least in the short run, the consequence is a fraying solidarity culture.
As in the United States, welfare state benefits grow more tenuous when they are identified with visibly different groups. The vision of shared com-munity fades into an image of expensive programs for strangers-people who are different, foreign, and possibly undeserving.
On their surface, the health care debates may be about controlling budgets, reevaluating benefits, and reimbursing physicians. But under the health policy nuances lurk deep questions about community, solidarity, and shared civic obligation.
Global Competition
Immigration interacts with the rise of global markets. International competition places liberal reforms-markets-on the agenda in every nation. Moreover, it places new kinds of pressure on established social welfare policies. Like new people seeking entry, new economic relations force open the "bounded world" of classic social distribution.
Naturally, different nations rely more or less on international trade. But across industrialized economies, the new market regime injects three new strategic considerations, all biased against bold social welfare policies. First, there is pressure to reduce total labor costs, at least in some industries. As domestic markets open to foreign competitors and international markets grow more important for local firms, the cost of labor overseas becomes an increasingly significant calculation.
Second, capital assumes a powerful new position. Business has generally occupied a privileged position in the politics of capitalist economies. But now, the threat of exit lends a special urgency to its policy preferences. Naturally, the relationship between business, politics, and the international economy varies enormously-firm by firm, sector by sector. Nevertheless, capital migration offers a powerful counterpoint to calls for new forms of social welfare spending (and taxation). And even apart from the political sphere, capital can pressure socially adventurous governments simply by taking a pessimistic view of the domestic economy and reining in investment and expansion plans. As Jan Goggin discusses elsewhere in this volume, the international order sets up a powerful tension between the local expansion of capitalist enterprise and the expansion of social welfare policies.
Finally, even apart from the local business, the international investment community holds its own daily vote of confidence on each nation-state. Foreign investment and currency markets offer another form of political pressure. They constitute a powerful structural constraint on budget deficits or overly generous social welfare regimes (for further discussion, see Freeman 1986: 61).
None of these forces predicts any particular form of action in any policy area, much less in health care. Indeed, health costs are so salient an issue that the pressures of international competition might lead away from health care competition and toward more powerful state intervention in medicine. After all, if market innovations in health care prove inflationary (even in the short run), they may prove short-lived.
Even so, the deeper structural changes remain. A new international regime places powerful constraints on social welfare policy. The emerging order challenges traditional notions of community, systematically empowers capital, and subverts the position of trade unions. These broad, evolving forces frame all discussions of health care policy-across the European Community and throughout the OECD.
Politicians, Physicians, and the Public
But what is happening in health care policy? Across the articles in this volume, the forces just described manifest themselves in variations on the same themes: government innovations driven by the cost imperative, eroding physician authority, and disorienting variations in the world of the patient-citizen.
The State
From the American perspective, what is most striking about European market medicine is the central role played by state officials. They introduce and manage the market forces, often expanding their own authority over health care in the process.
The English case features an "internal market"--run within a publicly funded national health service. State authority in the German case is more subtle but no less striking. There, as Marian Dohler has shown, public officials have been subtly shifting the balance of power between private agents-sickness funds (as payers) are being empowered at the expense of provider organizations (Dohler 1994) . More generally, David Wilsford (1995) suggests that charting the relative strength of state agents versus private interest groups yields an overarching structural predictor of health policy outcomes.
As the Scandinavian cases remind us, the state interest is neither static nor unitary. In both Sweden and Norway, the shifts between centralization and decentralization are more pronounced than are those between public and private. The same federalist dynamic plays out, to a lesser extent, in Canada, Germany, and the United States. And Richard Freeman here shows how subtle the politics of shifting state authority can get: Even preventive medicine can be viewed as an expansion of government "competence," although it shifts some of the burden for insuring health to the individuals themselves.
Providers
The most striking change in the interest group alignment, across the OECD, is the decline of physician control over health care policy. Of the countries examined in this volume, perhaps Norway offers the most vivid case. Vibeke Erichsen argues that traditional health policy in Norway could be characterized as a "profession state"-choices made by medical authorities are justified in professional terms. Today that form of nonpolitical decision making is coming to an end. Physicians still exercise considerable influence; however, they enjoy less institutionalized access to political authority and they must contend with alternate sources of expertise.
Changes in Germany are quite similar. The recent Seehofer reforms (of December 1992) passed amid a widely held judgment that physicians had failed to deliver their end of the bargain in the last round of reform (in 1989) . For instance, physicians failed to move toward the use of generic drugs. The result is a significant decline of physician power in their bargaining with sickness funds.
These cases are typical. Everywhere the medical profession is losing its status as trustee of medical policy (although in some countries this process is much farther along than in others). Furthermore, some states are now witnessing the first erosion in physician autonomy and authority over medical judgment.
By American standards, European physicians still enjoy substantial political influence and enormous authority over medical practice. There are only the first hints, among the articles in this volume, of the elaborate apparatus with which Americans oversee (and reimburse) their physicians. Moreover, the relatively weak inroads over physician autonomy are not backed up, in the European cases, by any counterparts to the American institutional capacity to hold professional feet to the financial fire. The elaborate managed care apparatus in the United States has, at least until now, few real counterparts across the Atlantic.
The great historical irony is that professional autonomy may be more secure in a statist health care system than under more private (or quasi-market) arrangements. The state that American physicians resisted so hard for so long is precisely the buffer between physician autonomy and the market forces that subordinate it. This is so for a number of reasons. States are less eager (or. alternately, less reckless) to promote managerial innovation than are private payers; they are less aggressive than corporate payers; they are more attuned to the suasion of organized and vocal interests-like providers-and perhaps their relative success at controlling costs softens the need to control what physicians do.
The irony of state protection of physician autonomy extends even to the American case. The one area in which the American state did extend its own authority, Medicare, is today the last bastion of traditional feefor-service medicine. Among workers, 60 percent are in managed plans; among Medicare beneficiaries, the figure is only 7 percent (Toner 1995) .
Will European physicians be able to maintain their relatively powerful professional autonomy? As competition stirs through Europe, American firms will be on hand to offer administrators and payers new managerial technologies. Will lay managers use the American protocols to begin controlling (alternately, "second-guessing") European physicians? Or will the state continue to offer a professional haven from managed care?
Patients
Finally, three distinct themes run through the articles that follow. First, there is the inevitable search for cost control, now with an increasing emphasis on market mechanisms. In many European countries, the burden sharing (copayments) by health care consumers comes as a sharp change from past experience. So do new limits on covered services. This raises all the ominous talk about the end of entitlement, solidarity, and universalism.
A second, contrasting story, however, lies in the struggle for enhanced consumer control in the face of "bureaucratic and inflexible" health care delivery. In Sweden, as Peter Garpenby notes, that struggle is played out in the tension between central and local government-decentralization becomes a tool to enhance consumer autonomy. In England, of course, the Working for Patients reforms (1991) aimed to use market mechanism, not only for efficiency but to promote patient involvement and patientphysician interaction. Scattered amid the tales of cost control lies a recurring struggle to make health care more responsive to ordinary citizens. Note the inevitable contrast to the American experience-in Europe both the problem and the solution lie within the state.
Third, and perhaps most striking, is the soft pitch to the debates over competition in health care. The tone (and volume) contrasts sharply to the discourse over the promises and the perils of market medicine. Excepting Karl Hinrichs's, most of the articles take a reasonably sanguine view of recent reforms. Competition, they suggest (or imply), may add efficiency and consumer control without subverting traditional collective visions. Throughout, there is what we called a "policy tinkerer" viewguarded optimism about the proposed marriage of medical markets and social welfare universalism.
The great question for the future turns on whether that optimism is justified. Can the reforms discussed in the following pages enhance efficiency without endangering universalism? Or are they the first steps in a tong slide down the slippery slope from the welfare state ideal?
